The space program had blossomed and flourished under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and was particularly identified with those presidents. Changes in the satellite communications industry were spurred by the policies of the Nixon Administration.
The incoming Nixon people were advocates of competition, not monopolies. They were pushed by Canada which was to orbit the world's first domestic satellite in November 1972, using American technology -- but without the constraints of American policy making. They announced a policy of "Open Skies" late in 1969 under which any financially qualified organization could apply for and expect to be granted authority to operate a domestic satellite system. This represented a dramatic reversal of what the Johnson Administration had been thinking about. [Wheelon, pg. 21]
The Open Skies policy of deregulation was accompanied by an abandonment of government sponsored research with the hope that competition would motivate the development of technology.
In January 1973, budget pressures caused NASA to essentially eliminate its satellite communications research and development program. Much of this work had been done at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, MD, but some of it was taking place at NASA's Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, OH. Lewis was working on advances in TWT design and was participating in the CTS project with the Canadians. Goddard had been responsible for most NASA experimental (as well as operational) communications satellites including the ATS series. ATS-F (ATS-6 on orbit) was far enough along in 1973 that it was decided to finish it, but ATS-G was canceled. With participation on the CTS project as a foot-in-the-door, Lewis had been working on concepts for ATS-H/I and had formed a group to define the spacecraft. This effort also died in 1973.
Through the mid-1970's, the challenge to NASA communications systems engineers was to revive the research and development program. Although the program had been canceled, work continued on satellites that were still operating in space as well as on projects that were too far along to stop. At Goddard, ATS 1 and ATS 3 continued their successful experience with public service communications. At Lewis, the emphasis was on technology development.
Both Lewis and Goddard were advocating revived space communications programs, but along very different lines. The Goddard position for public service satellites was in direct competition with industry. The technology development program at Lewis was in support of U.S. industry (although there were some companies who saw the Lewis approach as subsidizing competitors).
In the mid-to-late 1970's, market studies were showing that the synchronous orbit was getting crowded. The obvious solution to overcrowding was to expand the frequency range of communications satellites by moving into the Ka-band region. And the danger of foreign competition was looming.
The Japanese launched the first commercial Ka-band operational satellite on February 4, 1983. This satellite, called Sakura 2a, was built by Ford (now Loral) and Mitsubishi and was launched on a Japanese N2 rocket. It was Japan's first commercial communications satellite. It was replaced when Japan launched Sakura 3a on February 19, 1988 with 10 Ka-band transponders. Sakura 3a was the first satellite to use GaAs solar cells. [Jane's, pg. 66] In the 1990's, Loral has also built the Superbird and N-Star satellites for Japan with Ka-band transponders. Japan's National Space Development Agency (NASDA) designed and built the ETS 6 (Kiku 6) spacecraft with Japanese contractors led by Toshiba. The satellite will demonstrate ion propulsion, mobile communications, inter-satellite links, O-band (38/43 GHz) and laser communications. [Jane's, pp. 359-360]
While the Japanese had been working to transfer technology from the U.S., the Europeans struck out on their own. The Olympus satellite began development in 1979 as L-Sat. It was built by European aerospace companies with British Aerospace as the prime contractor. It was designed as a large, multipurpose satellite to demonstrate and promote new applications in television broadcasting, intercity telephone routing, and the use of Ka-band for videoconferencing and low-rate data for business communications. Olympus was launched on July 12, 1989 on an Ariane 3 rocket. It carried two Ka-band transponders with steerable spot beams. Olympus lost one solar array panel in January 1991. Control of the spacecraft was lost on May 29, 1991, but was regained by August. [Jane's, pp. 330-332]
Foreign competition was a strong argument for NASA's reinstatement of a commercial satellite development program. The technology that needed to be developed in the mid-1970's was fairly obvious. It involved extending the frequency bands that satellites used into the Ka-band.
There is a compelling synergy between the Ka-band, spot-beam, and on-board processor technologies. Ka-band almost requires spot beams to get around the problem of rain fade. Once you have spot beams, the idea of switching between them onboard the spacecraft is too rewarding to resist.
In 1977, the National Research Council Committee on Satellite Communications released a report entitled "Federal Research and Development for Satellite Communications." It looked at six options for NASA's program: 1) Keep the program at its current level of $2.4 million for the advancement of technology, 2) Expand the technology program to $15 to 20 million, 3) A satellite communications technology flight-test support program of one launch per year for industry experiments, 4) An experimental satellite communications technology flight program, 5) An experimental public service satellite communications system, 6) An operational public service system. The committee recommended options 4 and 5 and opposed option 6 saying:
"The Committee concludes that the arguments against an operational public service satellite communications system program (Option 6) are compelling, that such an option is inappropriate for NASA, and recommends against it." [NRC, pg. 30]The report summarized the required technology in the following paragraph:
The technical challenge in reducing costs for satellite service to small terminals is difficult, but it is no greater than that faced in originating satellite communications in 1958. The basic approach already can be envisioned. To enable small antennas to be used at earth terminals, high-gain satellite antennas must be employed. To be economical, these must be shared by large numbers of users at many locations. Many antenna beams from a single satellite will be required, along with methods for accurately aiming the antenna and a means for switching signals from one beam to another by means of a switching system aboard the satellite. [NRC, pp. 6-7]
In 1978, NASA decided to reenter the commercial communications satellite R&D field. [Lovell, pg. 4] The lead center was reassigned from Goddard to Lewis in light of the program's emphasis on technology. Lewis went to work to sell the Advanced 30/20 GHz Spacecraft which evolved into ACTS. Lewis also began a $45 million program of technology development using duplicate contracts in order to have the new designs needed for such a radically new spacecraft. This "Proof of Concept" hardware was not designed for flight, but was to demonstrate the needed capabilities to allow flight hardware design. Joe Sivo, Chief of the Lewis Communications Division, worked to get a consensus on the requirements of the advanced technology requirements by involving the U.S. communications carriers as well as the satellite builders in the program. The builders were included by awarding study contracts to each of the five major players: TRW, Hughes, Ford, GE, and RCA. These flight experiment system definition studies ranged in cost form $264k (RCA) to $1,213k (TRW). They were all completed in the summer of 1981.
Sivo recognized the importance of involving the users of the technology, the communications carriers. From November 1979 to May 1983 there were nine meetings of the Carrier Working Group formed by Sivo. This group of representatives from the major communications carriers met to define the flight system requirements and experiments. Membership included: American Satellite, AT&T Long Lines, Bell Labs, Comsat, GTE Satellite, Hughes Communications, ITT, RCA American Comm., Satellite Business Systems, Southern Pacific, and Western Union. It was important to have the input of the carriers since they would be the ultimate users of ACTS technology. The working group meetings focused mainly on potential experiments and reviewed the top-level spacecraft designs as they became available from the study contracts.
In 1985, the ATS program was transferred to Lewis to consolidate NASA's communications program. ATS 3 is still operational. [Cauley, pg. 1]